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INTRODUCTION 
“New York Court Expands Rights of Nonbirth Parents in Same-Sex 
Relationships.”1  So read the May 2010 New York Times headline 
reporting the outcome of Debra H. v. Janice R.,2 a case brought by a 
* Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law; 2011-2012
Visiting McDonald/Wright Chair in Law and Faculty Chair of the Williams Institute,
UCLA School of Law.  I am deeply grateful to the board and staff of the Journal of
Gender, Social Policy & the Law for their commitment to the March 25-26, 2011
symposium that produced this volume, and to Jennifer Dabson, Director of the WCL
Office of Special Events, for the logistical support that made the symposium possible.
My special thanks to Emily Ames, WCL Class of 2011, for her work as my research
assistant and to Elliot Kennedy, WCL Class of 2012, for his assistance in completing
this Article.
1. See Jeremy W. Peters, N.Y. Court Expands Rights of Nonbirth Parents in Same-
Sex Relationships, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2010, at A26 (summarizing the holding of 
Debra H. v. Janice R). 
2. See generally Debra H. v. Janice R. (Debra H. IV), 930 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y.
2010), reh’g denied, 933 N.E.2d 210 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 908 (2011) 
(holding that Debra H. could maintain custody and visitation rights based on comity 
1
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nonbiological mother seeking joint custody of the child she had raised with 
her former partner.  A reader would be forgiven for assuming that the court 
ruling marked a victory for same-sex couples and the children they raise. 
It did not; although, Debra H. did prevail.  Looked at solely from her 
viewpoint, the case was a win.  But I consider it an example of winning 
backward.  Winning backward is a victory whose legal basis sets back a 
goal greater than the immediate outcome.  It is distinguishable from 
incremental gain, which may not accomplish all that proponents hope for, 
but can be considered a step, even if small, toward the greater goal.  An 
incremental gain does not foreclose, push farther away, or make less likely 
achievement of that greater goal; winning backward does.3 
This Article examines protection of the status of some LGBT parents, 
specifically lesbians who are married to, or in an equivalent formal status 
with, a woman who bears a child.  I argue that obtaining parental rights 
based upon the legal relationship between the two mothers, without 
simultaneously creating parentage for a partner who is not married to a 
birth mother, is an example of winning backward.  It revives the discredited 
distinction between “legitimate” and “illegitimate” children, this time in the 
context of same-sex couples.  Without a shift in current movement 
priorities, it is not likely to be an incremental gain – a first step towards 
recognizing parentage on more appropriates bases.  Rather, parentage 
recognition derived from marriage will reduce the urgency of advocating 
protecting parent-child relationships on more suitable grounds.  Thus is 
born the phenomenon I call “the new ‘illegitimacy.’” 
given to her status under Vermont law as the civil union partner of the biological 
mother). 
3. I was inspired to articulate this concept of winning backward by the phrase
losing forward, coined by gay rights lawyer Evan Wolfson shortly before the 2004 
elections. See Evan Wolfson, Marriage Equality and Some Lessons for the Scary Work 
of Winning, FREEDOM TO MARRY, http://archivefreedomtomarry.org/evan_wolfson/ 
speeches/scary_work_of_winning.php (last visited June 28, 2011). Voters were about 
to approve bans on same-sex marriage in all eleven states where they appeared on the 
ballot.  Gay rights supporters were discouraged and angry about the money and effort 
devoted to these certain defeats. 
Wolfson defined losing forward as fighting the ballot initiatives using a strategy that 
would ultimately hasten marriage for same-sex couples.  That strategy, he argued, was 
telling compelling stories about the lives of real gay couples; other approaches, such as 
reliance on generic pleas for fairness and messages that changing the state’s 
constitution was unnecessary because the law already prohibited same-sex marriage, 
were a mistake.  They would not attract allies or move what he called the reachable 
middle third of the country toward support for marriage equality. Id. (“When, in the 
name of ‘practicality’ or advice from pollsters or political operatives, we fail to put 
forward compelling stories and explain the realities of what marriage equality does and 
does not mean, it costs us the one chance we have to do the heavy-lifting that moves 
people. We wind up not just not winning, but not even losing forward.”). 
Just as the way a campaign or case is lost can produce forward motion, the way a 
campaign or case is won can turn a social justice endeavor around and point it 
backward. 
2
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The first part of this Article describes Debra H. v. Janice R.  I show that 
Debra’s lawyers at Lambda Legal, the nation’s largest LGBT legal rights 
organization, argued for her parental rights based upon the couple’s intent 
to bear and raise the child together and Debra’s behavior as her son’s 
mother with Janice’s consent.4  Nonetheless, the New York Court of 
Appeals ruled in her favor based solely on her status as Janice’s Vermont 
civil union partner, a result that required it to misread Vermont law. 
Debra’s victory, coupled with the advent of marriage equality in New 
York, may make it harder to achieve legislative reform protecting parent-
child relationships for all children of same-sex couples in New York. 
In the second part of this Article, I examine two other Lambda Legal 
efforts.  In Iowa, Lambda represents married lesbian couples seeking a 
court order requiring the state to place the names of both spouses on the 
birth certificate of a child born to either spouse.  In Maryland, Lambda 
achieved this exact result through administrative advocacy.  I argue that 
these efforts are misguided because, even when successful, they make the 
parental status of a nonbiological mother dependent entirely upon her 
marriage to the biological mother. 
In both states, there were options to urge parentage reform unconnected 
to the marital status of the couple.  Advocacy that, instead, slices through a 
community of lesbian mothers and their children and makes some of those 
children “legitimate,” while leaving others unprotected, reflects a 
misplaced priority that will only magnify with time.  Parentage tied to 
marriage will need to be defended when challenged in a state that does not 
recognize same-sex marriage.  That defense, like all marriage-related 
advocacy, will become a priority, leaving yet fewer resources and less 
political will to demand protection for family relationships formed without 
marriage.  In conclusion, I argue that such an undesirable result can be 
avoided only by adhering to a principle that has guided family law for the 
last 40 years—that children should not suffer because their parents do not 
marry. 
I. DEBRA H. V. JANICE R.—THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS REBUFFS
A FULL-ON ATTACK ON ALISON D. V. VIRGINIA M.
Debra H. was the case that advocates hoped would overturn Alison D. v.
Virginia M., a shameful decision from almost twenty years earlier, in which 
a nonbiological mother was denied standing to petition for custody of or 
visitation with the child she had raised with her lesbian partner.5  The 
4. Debra H. IV, 930 N.E.2d at 184; see infra Parts I & II.
5. See Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991).
3
Polikoff: The New Illegitimacy: Winning Backward in the Protection of the C
724 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 20:3 
relevant statute gave standing to “parents” without defining that term,6 and 
the court refused to include a person in Alison’s position within the 
definition. 
In the intervening two decades, with glaring exceptions, most appellate 
courts had created a mechanism for ensuring that a child would not lose a 
parent when the couple’s relationship ended.7  Perhaps the most dramatic 
turnaround came in California.  In the Alison D. era, a California appeals 
court had also denied parental status to a nonbiological mother.8  In 2005, 
the California Supreme Court rejected that reasoning in a case that would 
unquestionably have made Debra a parent had the family lived in that 
state.9 
Debra’s complaint alleged numerous facts about the couple’s joint 
planning for, and joint parenting of, their son.  The trial court ruled that if 
she could prove those facts, Janice should be equitably estopped from 
blocking her petition for joint custody.10  The judge ordered visitation three 
days a week—the schedule the couple followed when they first split up.11  
Janice appealed and the Appellate Division issued a stay, then reversed, 
citing Alison D.12  Debra and the attorney for the child asked for review in 
the Court of Appeals and for reinstatement of pendente lite visitation.  The 
Court reinstated visitation one day a week and agreed to hear the case.13 
Among the facts asserted by Debra was that she and Janice had gone to 
Vermont and entered a civil union one month before their son’s birth.  This 
played a small role in the arguments made on her behalf.  In the sixty-six-
page argument section of her Court of Appeals brief, Debra devoted only 
five and a half pages to the claim that New York should recognize her 
parentage based on the couple’s Vermont civil union.14  Seven friend of the 
6. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 70 (McKinney 2011).
7. See NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RTS., Legal Recognition of LGBT Families (2011),
http://www.nclrights.org/site/DocServer/Legal_Recognition_of_LGBT_Families.pdf 
(identifying numerous states in section IV). 
8. See Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a
lesbian partner who was not the natural or adoptive parent could not fall under the 
purview of the Uniform Parentage Act, and therefore could not receive custody rights 
over the objection of the mother). 
9. See Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005) (holding that a non-
biological lesbian mother could be a presumed parent under the Uniform Parentage 
Act). 
10. Debra H. v. Janice R. (Debra H. I), No. 106569/08, 2008 WL 7675822 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Oct. 2, 2008), rev’d by 877 N.Y.S.2d 259 (App. Div. 2009). 
11. See id. (providing that the stipulation regarding visits from July 2008 should
remain in place unless it is determined to be outside the child’s best interests). 
12. Debra H. v. Janice R. (Debra H. II), 877 N.Y.S.2d 259 (App. Div. 2009).
13. See Debra H. v. Janice R. (Debra H. III), 914 N.E.2d 1006 (N.Y. 2009) (order
granting stay and reinstatement of visitation); id. at 1011 (order granting leave to 
appeal). 
14. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 74-80, Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184
4
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court briefs were filed in support of Debra.  The briefs represented bar 
associations,15 children’s groups,16 civil liberties organizations,17 mental 
health workers,18 family law academics from every New York law school,19 
and well over a dozen gay rights groups.20 All amici emphatically argued 
that the law should recognize Debra’s relationship with her son either by 
distinguishing or overruling Alison D.21  None asked the court to rule in 
Debra’s favor based on her civil union status.22  The only brief to even 
mention the significance of the civil union was that filed by the gay rights 
groups, and it devoted less than a page to the subject; did not even give it a 
subheading; and noted it only as a subset of its argument that the law that 
makes a consenting husband the parent of the child born to his wife using 
donor insemination should apply equally to unmarried couples.23 
The ruling that prompted the headline with which I began this article 
found Debra a parent of her son because he was born while she and Janice 
were in a Vermont civil union. The court reaffirmed Alison D. in its 
entirety.24  It reasoned that the functional tests urged by Debra and her 
amici would produce an intolerable level of uncertainty about a child’s 
parentage.25  Recognizing parentage derived from the couple’s civil union, 
(N.Y. 2010) (No. 106569/08). 
15. Brief for N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n, Women’s Bar Ass’n of the State of N.Y., N.Y. et
al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner-Appellant, Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 
184 (N.Y. 2010) (No. 106569/08) [hereinafter Bar Ass’n Brief]. 
16. Brief for Citizens’ Comm. for Children, Lawyers for Children, & Children’s
Law as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner-Appellant, Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 
N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2010) (No. 106569/08) [hereinafter Brief for Children’s Group]. 
17. Brief for N.Y. Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner-Appellant, Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2010) (No. 
106569/08) [hereinafter Brief for Civil Liberties Organizations]. 
18. Brief for Nat’l Assoc. of Soc. Workers et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner-Appellant, Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2010) (No. 
106569/08) [hereinafter Mental Health Workers Brief]. 
19. Brief for Family Law Academics as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner-
Appellant, Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2010) (No. 106569/08) 
[hereinafter Family Law Academics Brief]. 
20. Brief for Nat’l Ctr. for Lesbian Rights et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner-Appellant, Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2010) (No. 
106569/08) [hereinafter Gay Rights Groups Brief]. 
21. See, e.g., Bar Ass’n Brief, supra note 15 (supporting Debra H’s relationship
with her son and urging the court to overrule Alison D.); Brief for Children’s Group, 
supra note 16 (same); Brief for Civil Liberties Organizations, supra note 17 (same); 
Mental Health Workers Brief, supra note 18 (same); Family Law Academics Brief, 
supra note 19(same); Gay Rights Groups Brief, supra note 20 (same). 
22. See, e.g., Mental Health Workers Brief, supra note 18 (failing to ask the court
to rule in Debra’s favor). 
23. Gay Rights Groups Brief, supra note 20, at 35.
24. Debra H. IV, 930 N.E.2d 184, 206 (N.Y. 2010), reh’g denied, 933 N.E.2d 210
(N.Y. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 908 (2011). 
25. Id. at 194.  For a thorough critique of this argument, see Carlos Ball, Rendering
5
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the court claimed, was a clear and certain test.26 The court examined 
Vermont law, declared that Vermont would consider Debra a parent as a 
result of the civil union, and applied the doctrine of comity to recognize her 
parental status in New York.27  Now that same-sex couples can marry in 
New York, the distinction articulated in Debra H. will solidify into a 
distinction between those who marry and those who do not.28 
But the Debra H. court got Vermont law wrong.  A child born to a 
couple in a civil union in Vermont is not automatically and predictably the 
child of both women.  Below, I describe Vermont law and demonstrate the 
New York court’s misreading of that law.  Then, I explain that misreading 
by considering the overwhelming emphasis on achieving formal 
recognition for same-sex couples, through marriage or, as a second-best 
result, through civil unions or comprehensive domestic partnership. 
A. The Debra H. Court misstated Vermont Parentage Law by Misreading
Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins 
Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins29 is the only Vermont case in which a 
nonbiological mother separated from a biological mother has argued that 
she is a legal parent, and the court’s reasoning in Debra H. relied upon it. 
Lisa Miller-Jenkins gave birth to Isabella Miller-Jenkins while she was in a 
civil union with Janet Miller-Jenkins.  After the couple split up, Lisa 
argued that Janet was not Isabella’s parent because they lacked a biological 
connection. 
The Vermont court rejected this argument.  If Lisa was correct that 
biology determined parentage, the court reasoned, then no child born of 
donor insemination would have a second parent unless the second parent 
adopted the child.30  This would even apply to the children of married 
heterosexual couples, because Vermont has no statute declaring that a 
consenting husband is the father of a child born to his wife using donor 
insemination.  The court wished for legislative guidance, but in its absence 
the court found itself bound to protect the best interests of children.31  The 
Children Illegitimate in Former Partner Parenting Cases: Hiding Behind the Façade 
of Certainty, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 623 (2012). 
26. See Debra H. IV, 930 N.E.2d at 194.
27. See generally id.
28. The court might continue to recognize parentage based on civil union or
comprehensive domestic partnership when the couple moved to New York from a state 
that provided only a formal status other than marriage and the couple entered that status 
while living in that state. 
29. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins (Miller-Jenkins I), 912 A.2d 951 (Vt. 2006).
30. See id. at 967.
31. See id. at 970 (acknowledging that there is no legislative intent, and therefore
the court must look to other sources of authority for interpretation). 
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court cited its 1993 ruling authorizing second parent adoption as an 
example of stepping in to protect children born of assisted reproduction in 
the absence of legislative direction.32 
The court noted that, “The parentage act does not include a definition of 
‘parent.’ . . . We have held that the term ‘parent’ is specific to the context 
of the family involved.”33  The court then listed the “many factors” 
supporting its determination that Janet was Isabella’s parent.34  The civil 
union was the first and most important of these factors.35  But there were 
others.  These included the expectation and intent of both women that Janet 
would be a parent; Janet’s participation in the decision that Lisa would bear 
a child and her active participation in prenatal care and the child’s birth; the 
fact that both women treated Janet as a parent while they lived together and 
that Lisa identified Janet as a parent when she filed to dissolve the civil 
union; and that no one else claimed to be a parent so a decision against 
Janet would leave Isabella with only one parent.36 
Under these circumstances, the court ruled, a husband would be the 
father of a child born to his wife, and Janet was the parent of the child born 
to her civil union partner.37  The court cited numerous donor insemination 
cases from other states, including one that found parentage in an unmarried 
woman’s male partner.38  After noting that those rulings relied on varying 
legal theories, the Vermont court stated that, “we adopt the result in this 
case as a matter of policy and to implement the intent of the parties.”39  
Although the civil union was “extremely persuasive evidence” of Janet’s 
parentage, the court stated that “because so many factors are present in this 
case that allow us to hold that the nonbiologically-related partner is the 
child’s parent, we need not address which factors may be dispositive on the 
issue in a closer case.”40 
In holding Debra to be the parent of her son, the New York Court of 
Appeals said simply this: “In Miller-Jenkins, the Vermont Supreme Court 
relied upon [the civil union statute] to hold that a child born by artificial 
32. Id. at 967 (citing In re Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993)).
33. See id. at 969.
34. See id. at 970.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 970 (citing Brown v. Brown, 125 S.W.3d 840 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003);
People v. Sorensen, 437 P.2d 495 (Cal. 1968); In re Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 
(Ct. App. 1998); Levin v. Levin, 645 N.E.2d 601 (Ind. 1994); R.S. v. R.S., 670 P.2d 
923 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983); State ex rel. H. v. P., 457 N.Y.S.2d 488 (App. Div. 1982); 
Brooks v. Fair, 532 N.E.2d 208 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988); In re Baby Doe, 353 S.E.2d 877 
(S.C. 1987)). 
39. Miller-Jenkins I, 912 A.2d at 971.
40. Id.
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insemination to one partner of a civil union should be deemed the other 
partner’s child under Vermont law . . . .”41 
But Miller-Jenkins did no such thing.  It looked at Lisa and Janet’s civil 
union but also looked at other factors to reach its conclusion.  Debra might 
not have been found a parent in Vermont because Janice strenuously 
disputed numerous facts claimed by Debra, including whether Debra 
participated in Janice’s decision to have a child and in selecting the semen 
donor.42  A Vermont court would have ruled on these factual disputes 
before resolving whether Debra was a parent. This is precisely the inquiry 
the New York Court of Appeals claimed it was avoiding by affirming Alison 
D. 
The New York court’s reliance on Miller-Jenkins is especially striking 
given that neither the Vermont nor the New York statute defined the term 
“parent,” yet Miller-Jenkins found that it is the responsibility of the court to 
protect children when there is insufficient legislative direction, while 
Debra H. eschewed that role. 
B. The Bright Line of Marriage/Civil Union is the Easy, But Wrong,
Approach 
When Isabella was born, civil union was the only formal status available 
to same-sex couples.  Now, marriage is possible in seven jurisdictions—
including, most recently, in New York43—and an equivalent formal status 
in nine more.44  The Debra H. court wanted an on-off switch and the civil 
union made that possible. 
The existence of marriage—or an equivalent formal status—makes it 
easier to implement bright line rules about legal consequences.  This ease 
means that judges and legislators, satisfied that marriage is a good enough 
dividing line, will be less likely to engage in the messier business of 
achieving justice.  Because marriage is the most visible item on the gay 
41. Debra H. IV, 930 N.E.2d 184, 195 (N.Y. 2010), reh’g denied, 933 N.E.2d 210
(N.Y. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 908 (2011). 
42. Debra H. I, No. 106569/08, 2008 WL 7675822 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 2, 2008),
rev’d by 877 N.Y.S.2d 259 (App. Div. 2009). 
43. Jurisdictions that allow same-sex marriage include Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Iowa, Vermont, New Hampshire, District of Columbia, and New York.  See 
Relationship Recognition for Same-Sex Couples in the U.S., NAT’L GAY & LESBIAN
TASK FORCE (June 28, 2011), http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/ 
reports/issue_maps/rel_recog_6_28_11_color.pdf (depicting the different types of 
relationships various states legally recognize). 
44. Jurisdictions with an equivalent formal status: New Jersey, Illinois, Delaware,
Hawaii, California, Oregon, Washington, Rhode Island, and Nevada.  Id.  While 
Washington has passed a law legalizing same-sex marriage, it will not go into effect 
until later this year, and opponents are likely to repeal it through referendum. See 
Washington: Gay Marriage Legalized, N.Y. TIMES, Feb 13, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/14/us/washington-gay-marriage-legalized.html.  
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rights agenda, with civil union or comprehensive domestic partnership 
understood as another way—even if a lesser one—of validating same-sex 
couples, judges and legislators can actually feel good about a bright-line 
rule that favors those who opt in to marriage or its legal equivalent.  They 
do not need to think about developing a better rule. 
For most of history, marriage was an on-off switch determining a man’s 
parentage.  A man was a parent of a child born to his wife and not a parent 
of a child born to any other woman.45  This is no longer the case.  Not only 
can a man genetically connected to a child be found a parent in the absence 
of marriage, even if he is married to a different woman46 or the woman is 
married to a different man,47 but under varying legal standards, a man who 
is not the genetic father of a child can be a legal parent because he held the 
child out as his own,48 signed an acknowledgment of parentage,49 
commissioned a child born to a surrogate,50 said he would adopt a child,51 
or consented to a woman’s insemination with the intent to parent the 
45. See generally HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY
(1971). 
46. See, e.g., Abbe v. Bochert, No. C.A.19637, 2000 WL 327233, at *1 (Ohio. Ct.
App. Mar. 29, 2000) (affirming an order for a father married to another woman to pay 
child support and awarding visitation). 
47. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 607 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 50 (Supp. 2011)
(establishing that a man may bring a proceeding within two years after the birth of a 
child to establish parentage of a child born to a woman who is married to another man); 
see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 7541(b) (West 2010) (designating that a motion for blood 
tests to establish paternity must be brought within two years from a child’s date of 
birth). 
48. See, e.g., In re Nicholas H., 46 P.3d 932, 937 (Cal. 2002) (showing that
receiving a child into one’s home and holding the child out as one’s own supports the 
court’s conclusion that a man may be a presumed father of the child even if he admits 
he is not the biological father of the child); see also UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a) 
(amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 22-23 (Supp. 2011) (“A man is presumed to be the father 
of a child if: . . . for the first two years of the child’s life, he resided in the same 
household with the child and openly held out the child as his own.”). 
49. E.g., Sinicropi v. Mazurek, 760 N.W.2d 520, 525 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008)
(explaining that the court cannot enter an order of filiation under the state Paternity Act 
if an acknowledgement of parentage has already been executed and has not been 
revoked); In re J.B., 953 A.2d 1186, 1189 (N.H. 2008) (noting that under state law, an 
affidavit of paternity establishes paternity, and a challenge to the paternity after 60 days 
of filing the affidavit must be brought before a court). 
50. E.g., In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282 (Ct. App. 1998)
(applying the rule that a husband is the “lawful father of a child unrelated to him when 
his wife gives birth after artificial insemination” because of his consent to artificial 
insemination, and holding that a husband is a lawful father after a surrogate gives birth 
to a biologically unrelated child on his behalf because he and his wife “initiated and 
consented to” the procedure). 
51. E.g., Geramifar v. Geramifar, 688 A.2d 475, 478-79 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997)
(holding that even though the husband and wife never finalized the adoption of a child, 
they obtained guardianship in Iran, and because the husband entered into a contract to 
adopt the child, he has an obligation to support the child unless the duty is terminated 
by an order of the court). 
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resulting child.52 
Any rule that gives a child two legal parents if the couple is married—or 
in a civil union or domestic partnership—and one legal parent if the couple 
is not is a move backward more than forty years.  In 1968, the Supreme 
Court began striking down laws as unconstitutional that disadvantaged both 
children whose parents were not married and parents who had children 
outside marriage.53  A rule that introduces the discredited division between 
marital and non-marital children into the families created by same-sex 
couples is a step backward.  That it comes in the context of a win for a 
civilly-unioned mother is no consolation.  That is what makes it an example 
of winning backward. 
We cannot know for sure how the case would have been decided had 
Debra and Janice not been in a civil union.  Two of the unanimous seven 
who ruled for Debra wrote concurrences based on grounds other than the 
civil union.54  In the absence of the civil union, the other five would have 
been forced to confront the tragedy of depriving a child of a parent and 
would have had only one way out: distinguishing or overruling Alison D.  I 
do not know if two of those five justices would have so voted, but their 
dramatic misreading of Miller-Jenkins gives me reason to believe that they 
wanted to find two parents for this child. 
One might argue that it cannot be considered winning backward unless a 
court ruling makes it worse than it was before the “win.”  Since Debra 
could not have won under the Alison D. framework, the case may not seem 
like a backward step.  But just as the idea of losing forward acknowledges 
the current loss but looks ahead to better days that will be produced by the 
way the fight was fought,55 winning backward acknowledges the current 
win but looks ahead to dire consequences that will be difficult to dislodge. 
At worst, Debra would have lost.  That loss might have been the impetus 
to push through legislative change.  In a companion case handed down the 
52. E.g., In re Parentage of M.J., 787 N.E.2d 144, 152 (Ill. 2003) (holding that a
man who orally consented to and encouraged a woman to become pregnant through 
artificial insemination is legally obligated to support the child, just as an unmarried 
man who biologically causes conception is legally obligated to support a child). 
53. See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968) (holding that “illegitimate
child” is an invidious classification, and it is unconstitutional to deny a non-marital 
child the opportunity to recover damages for the loss of his mother); Glona v. Am. 
Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75-76 (1968) (holding that state law that 
denies a mother the ability to recover for the wrongful death of her non-marital child on 
the basis of the child being “illegitimate” violates the Equal Protection Clause). 
54. See Debra H. IV, 930 N.E.2d 184, 202 (N.Y. 2010) (Ciparick, J., concurring)
(arguing that a functional test will more often result in an outcome that serves the best 
interests of the child), reh’g denied, 933 N.E.2d 210 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. 
Ct. 908 (2011); Debra H. IV, 930 N.E.2d at 205 (Smith, J., concurring) (arguing for the 
application of the common law presumption of parentage for same-sex couples living 
together). 
55. See supra note 3.
10
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 12
2012] THE NEW “ILLEGITIMACY”: WINNING BACKWARD 731
same day, the New York Court of Appeals ruled that a non-biological 
mother could be ordered to pay child support to a former partner for a child 
they planned and raised together.56  The sharp contrast between assigning 
financial responsibility on the one hand, yet denying the right to a 
relationship on the other, would have made a powerful case for a broken 
statutory scheme.57 
The numerous amici in this case could have made an influential lobbying 
force if they turned their attention to the legislature as the only avenue 
available to avoid another twenty years of disastrous outcomes for children. 
The amici staked out substantive positions, and none asked the court to rule 
for Debra as a result of the civil union.58  Yet it is much harder to make a 
case for legislative change after an outcome heralded as an expansion of 
the rights of same-sex parents. 
Lambda Legal did encourage statutory reform after Debra H.  A bill 
introduced in the New York State Assembly would have amended the 
statutory definition of parent.59  That definition would include a gender-
neutral, marital-status-neutral “person” who consents to a woman’s 
insemination with the intent to parent.60  In an apparent effort to implement 
intent- and function-based parentage while being mindful of the Debra H. 
56. H.M. v. E.T., 930 N.E.2d 206, 209 (N.Y. 2010).
57. Had Debra wished to avoid her responsibilities towards the child, Janice could
have succeeded in getting an order requiring her to pay child support.  Because the two 
cases were decided on completely different legal theories, a mother ordered to pay 
child support under H.M., might still be ineligible to claim visitation or custody. 
58. See Brief for Children’s Group, supra note 16, at 5-6 (stressing that the court
should determine whether a de facto parental relationship existed and whether it is the 
child’s best interest to preserve the relationship); Family Law Academics Brief, supra 
note 19, at 1 (suggesting the family law approach to custody and visitation rights 
rejects the rule of Alison D.); Mental Health Workers Brief, supra note 18, at 6 
(asserting that social science studies of children’s best interests show that New York 
courts should allow gay and lesbian parents to petition for visitation and custody on the 
basis of the bonds being critical to children’s development and well-being); Gay Rights 
Groups Brief, supra note 20, at 3 (maintaining that the court should recognize de facto 
parental relationships and hold that “the presumption of parentage applies equally to all 
intended parents who plan to conceive a child together using anonymous donor 
sperm”); Bar Ass’n Brief, supra note 15, at 1 (arguing that the court should reconsider 
and overturn Alison D.); Brief for Civil Liberties Organizations, supra note 17, at 2 
(suggesting that the court has moved away from precluding de facto claims of 
parentage with regard to visitation or custody, and the application of Alison D. is 
“outmoded”). 
59. See A.B. 700, 234th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2011) (amending the
definition of parent to create parentage, inter alia, for a gender-neutral, marital-status 
neutral “person” who consents to a woman’s insemination with the intent to parent). 
60. This part of the bill appears to be modeled on the District of Columbia’s
parentage statute enacted in 2009.  See Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have 
to Adopt Her Own Child: Parentage Laws for Children of Lesbian Couples in the 
Twenty-First Century, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 201, 247-50 (2009) (discussing the 
District of Columbia’s legislation that establishes parentage of both mothers when they 
have a child through assisted reproduction using donor insemination). 
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court’s concern about bright lines, the bill also would have defined a parent 
as a person who could prove by clear and convincing evidence that the 
parent consented to the formation of a parent-child relationship in some 
written form such as a birth certificate, written agreement, birth 
announcement, document from a religious ceremony, or school or medical 
record.61  That person also would have to both live with the child for long 
enough time to establish a bonded, dependent, parent-child relationship and 
perform parental functions to a significant decree.62 
The parentage reform effort in New York was entirely eclipsed by 
advocacy for access to marriage for same-sex couples.  Furthermore, the 
advent of marriage equality in New York may stall any interest in 
reforming parentage legislation.  At the time of Debra H. there was no 
formal status available to same-sex couples in New York.  The opinion was 
greeted with some incredulity because it made parentage dependent upon a 
legal status that couples would have to leave to the state to accomplish.63  
This is no longer necessary. 
New York is not the only place where this new form of “illegitimacy” 
exists.  Two cases in Massachusetts, the first state to allow same-sex 
couples to marry, demonstrate disturbing acceptance of distinguishing 
“legitimate” from “illegitimate” children of same-sex couples.  Consistent 
with the Uniform Parentage Act as originally written in 1973, under 
Massachusetts law, a husband who consents to his wife’s insemination is 
the father of the resulting child.64  In T.F. v. B.L., a woman, B.L., consented 
to her partner’s insemination but left the relationship before the child was 
born and refused to support the child.65  At the time, Massachusetts did not 
61. A.B. 700.
62. As a point of comparison, California defines a parent to include a birth
mother’s partner when that person (male or female) receives the child into her home 
and holds the child out as her own.  See Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 667 
(Cal. 2005). There is no minimum period of time that the child and that parent must 
live together.  See Charisma R. v. Kristina S., 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 26, 36-37 (Ct. App. 
2009).  In Delaware, on the other hand, a legal parent includes a “de facto” parent, but 
that status requires that the person “has acted in a parental role for a length of time 
sufficient  to have established  a bonded and dependent relationship with the child that 
is parental in nature.”  DEL. CODE ANN. tit 13, § 8-201(c) (2009). 
63. In articulating why her client’s victory in Debra H. was insufficient, Lambda
Legal attorney Susan Sommer said, “Children whose parents conceive them using an 
anonymous donor but haven’t traveled out of state to enter into a civil union or 
marriage should be protected as well.”  New York High Court Rules in Lambda Legal 
Case: Vermont Civil Union Establishes Parental Rights of Non-Biological Mother, 
LAMBDA LEGAL (May 4, 2010), http://www.lambdalegal.org/news/pr/ny_20100504_ny-
high-court-rules-in-lambda-legal-case.html. 
64. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 46, § 4B (2009); accord N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73(1)
(McKinney 2011) (designating that a child born by artificial insemination shall be 
considered the “birth child” of the husband and wife who consent in writing to the 
wife’s insemination). 
65. See T.F. v. B.L., 813 N.E.2d 1244, 1247-48 (Mass. 2004).
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allow same-sex couples to marry, but by the time this case reached the 
Supreme Judicial Court it did allow such marriages.  Had the couple been 
married, B.L. would have been the child’s parent; the court stated this 
explicitly.66  In the absence of marriage, the court found neither statutory 
nor common-law authority for determining that B.L. had responsibility for 
supporting the child.67 
In A.H. v. M.P., the couple used in vitro fertilization, which resulted in 
M.P.’s pregnancy. Both women signed the consent forms at the fertility
clinic; A.H.’s surname became the child’s middle name; and the child
called M.P., “Mommy,” and A.H., “Mama.”68  The couple’s relationship
ended when the child was almost two years old, and M.P. refused A.H.
access to the child.69  A.H. instituted a court proceeding asking for joint
custody and for an order requiring her to pay child support.70  The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court rejected every theory she advanced
as a basis for maintaining her relationship with the child.71  Had the couple
been married, the decades-old statute on donor insemination of married
couples would have secured A.H.’s parentage.72
Both New York and Massachusetts allow a same-sex partner to 
adopt a child through second-parent adoption.73  There are numerous 
reasons why couples do not go this route.  It is time consuming and 
expensive, it requires a lawyer, it subjects the family to court scrutiny, and 
it cannot start until after the child’s birth, leaving the relationship 
unrecognized for months or longer until a final adoption decree is signed. 
Couples may be unfamiliar with such procedures, may lack resources to 
66. Id. at 1249-50; see Della Corte v. Ramirez, No. 11-P-451, 2012 WL 285026
(Mass. App. Ct. Feb. 2, 2012).  Courts have repeatedly held that a husband who 
consents to his wife’s insemination is the parent of the resulting child even if the couple 
splits up before the child is born.  See, e.g., Laura W.W. v. Peter W.W., 856 N.Y.S.2d 
248, 263-64 (App. Div. 2008) (affirming the lower court’s conclusion that the husband 
is the legal father because he consented to his wife’s decision to conceive the child 
through artificial insemination). 
67. See T.F., 813 N.E.2d at 1253 (holding that because B.L. is not a parent of the
child under any statutory provision and is “legally a stranger to the child,” B.L. has no 
duty to support the child). 
68. See A.H. v. M.P., 857 N.E.2d 1061, 1065 (Mass. 2006).
69. See id. at 1067-69.
70. See id. at 1068.
71. See id. at 1074-75.
72. See id. at 1074 (explaining that where a person is not a child’s biological or
adoptive parent, a private agreement is not sufficient to create parental rights). 
73. See, e.g., Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 318-19 (Mass. 1993)
(concluding that the statute does not preclude joint adoption of a child by unmarried 
same-sex partners, and noting that the joint adoption would serve the purpose of the 
statute since it would be in the best interest of the child); In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 
401 (N.Y. 1995) (holding that allowing unmarried second parents to adopt is consistent 
with the language of the statue and the statute’s purpose, which is to encourage the 
adoption of children). 
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pursue them, and may not understand the ramifications of not completing 
them. 
 Courts in some states that permit second-parent adoption also 
established theories that protect the parent-child relationship in the absence 
of an adoption.74  This must be done because, as I have said elsewhere, a 
mother should not have to adopt her own child.75  States that allow a 
lesbian couple to marry or enter into a civil union or comprehensive 
domestic partnership must similarly make a parental status available on a 
basis other than the formalization of the couple’s relationship. 
II. THE MISTAKE OF SEEKING A WIN FOR MARRIED LESBIANS ONLY
Lambda Legal did not urge a win for Debra H. based on the civil union. 
The New York court handed down a winning backward result, but it did so 
without encouragement from gay rights groups.  This stands in contrast to 
two other Lambda efforts, in Iowa and in Maryland.  In both those states 
there was a problem with recognition of a parental relationship between a 
child and her nonbiological mother.  In both, there was an option to 
prioritize actions that would protect those relationships regardless of the 
legal relationship between the two mothers.  Furthermore, in both, Lambda 
chose a path that at best would protect the parent-child relationship only if 
the mothers were married. 
A. Iowa
Lambda was successful counsel in Varnum v. Brien, the case that 
brought same-sex marriage to Iowa.76  The Iowa Attorney General has 
refused to authorize the addition of a female spouse’s name as a parent on 
the birth certificate of a child born to a married lesbian.77  Lambda is back 
74. See, e.g., Charisma R. v. Kristina S., 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 26, 47 (Ct. App. 2009)
(noting that a parentage presumption would further “public policy favoring a child 
having two parents . . . as a source of both emotional and financial support”), cert. 
denied, 130 S. Ct. 1522 (2010); V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 555 (N.J. 2000) (holding 
that because V.C. is the “psychological parent,” she should not be precluded from 
visitation with the children since continued visitation is in the children’s best interests); 
Shineovich v. Shineovich, 214 P.3d 29, 40 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) (extending the statute 
that establishes parentage for a consenting husband whose wife bears a child through 
artificial insemination to the consenting same-sex partner of a woman who bears a 
child through artificial insemination); In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 172-73 
(Wash. 2005) (creating de facto parentage). 
75. Polikoff, supra note 60, at 205-06 (asserting that while second-parent adoption
has been a useful legal tool for gay and lesbian families, it is a problematic solution 
because a nonbiological lesbian mother is forced to adopt her own child to secure the 
family’s legal protection). 
76. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 906 (Iowa 2009) (holding that the Iowa
marriage statute violates equal protection of the law under Iowa’s constitution by 
depriving gay and lesbian people admission into civil marriage). 
77. See, e.g., Linda Waddington, Same-Sex Couple Sues State for Right to Appear
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in court challenging the attorney general’s opinion of what the law 
requires.78 
This is a mistake for a simple reason.  If successful, these efforts will 
benefit only the children of couples who marry.  It is one thing to be 
saddled with a distinction between children born in or out of formalized 
relationships, as the Debra H. court has done.  It is quite another to expend 
efforts to achieve such a distinction. 
Iowa has no statute on children born of assisted conception.  It does not 
have a parentage statute creating a presumption of parentage based on 
holding a child out as one’s own, as some states do.  It has not recognized 
“de facto” parents.  At the time the Iowa Attorney General staked out his 
position, there were law reform avenues that could have solidified the 
relationships of many more same-sex couples raising children without 
dividing the children of Iowa’s lesbian couples into those who are 
“legitimate” and those who are “illegitimate.”79 
An Iowa trial judge has ruled in Lambda’s favor, but only when 
conception occurs through unknown donor insemination.80 If Lambda 
successfully defends that ruling on appeal, so that a child’s birth certificate 
must list two women if those women are married and use an anonymous 
donor to conceive, it will have accomplished little, even for those children. 
Although it is evidence, a birth certificate is not a definitive determination 
of parentage.  Furthermore, parentage achieved solely because a couple is 
married is vulnerable in the majority of states that ban recognition of same-
sex marriages.  Even if Lambda is successful in its Iowa action, a biological 
mother who moves out of state with the child will be able to claim in most 
states that the non-biological mother’s parentage should not be recognized 
because it derives solely from a marriage that is not recognized. 
on Daughter’s Birth Certificate, IOWA INDEP., May 30, 2010, 
http://iowaindependent.com/33946/same-sex-couple-sues-state-for-right-to-appear-on-
daughters-birth-certificate. 
78. See generally Gartner v. Newton, LAMBDA LEGAL (May 7, 2010),
http://www.lambdalegal.org/in-court/cases/gartner-v-newton (summarizing Lambda 
Legal’s policy argument in Gartner v. Newton). 
79. In November 2010, Republicans gained control of the Iowa House of
Representatives and the state elected a Republican governor.  See Iowa Election Results 
2010: Leonard Boswell Defeats Brad Zaun in Close Race, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2010, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/11/02/AR2010110207857.html.  By focusing in early 2010 on 
a court-based solution for married lesbian couples only, Lambda lost the opportunity to 
seek legislation on parentage of children conceived through assisted reproduction when 
the governor was a Democrat and both houses of the legislature were controlled by 
Democrats. 
80. See Gartner v. Iowa Dep’t of Pub. Health, No. CE 67807, slip op. at 11 (Iowa
Dist. Ct. Jan. 4, 2012) (finding that the Department could not possibly identify the 
biological father when the sperm was donated anonymously, thereby negating the 
Department’s argument that, in order to prevent future confusion, the same-sex spouse 
must formally adopt the child to appear on the child’s birth certificate). 
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This was the argument made by Lisa Miller in the long-running Miller-
Jenkins custody dispute.81  After Virginia enacted its Marriage Affirmation 
Act,82 Lisa, who was living with Isabella in Virginia, argued that because 
Janet’s parental status derived from the civil union, and Virginia did not 
recognize that civil union, then Virginia should find that Lisa was 
Isabella’s only parent.83  Lisa was unsuccessful because Vermont was the 
first state to rule on the child’s custody and Virginia was required to give 
full faith and credit to Vermont’s orders.84  Had Lisa filed initially in 
Virginia, the argument that Janet should be considered Isabella’s mother 
because she and Lisa were in a civil union might well have produced a 
different result.  For this reason, lawyers around the country, from the first 
marriages recognized in Massachusetts, have warned couples not to rely on 
their marriages alone to create parental rights.85 
Given the need to protect all the children of same-sex couples in Iowa, it 
81. The case has been litigated multiple times in the appellate courts of Vermont
and Virginia.  Miller-Jenkins I, 912 A.2d 951 (Vt. 2006), cert denied, 550 U.S. 918 
(2007); Miller-Jenkins v. Miller Jenkins (Miller-Jenkins II), No. 2007-271, 2008 WL 
2811218 at *1 (Vt. Mar. 18, 2008) (affirming family court’s order on appeal after 
remand), cert denied, 129 S. Ct. 306 (2008); Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 12 A.3d 
768 (Vt. 2010); Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins (Miller-Jenkins III), 637 S.E.2d 330, 
337 (Va. Ct. App. 2006) (vacating earlier order, and holding that the Virginia trial court 
did not have jurisdiction over the case due to the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act); 
Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, No. 0688-06-4, 2007 WL 1119817, at *1 (Va. Ct. 
App. Apr. 17, 2007) (vacating trial court’s order refusing to allow Janet Miller-Jenkins 
to register the Vermont order in Virginia), aff’d, Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins 
(Miller-Jenkins IV), 661 S.E.2d 822 (Va. 2008), cert denied, 555 U.S. 1069 (2008); 
Miller v. Jenkins, 678 S.E.2d 268 (Va. Ct. App. 2009); Miller v. Jenkins, No. 0705-09-
4, 2010 WL 605737 (Va. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2010). 
82. The language of Virginia’s law is very broad.  It reads: “A civil union,
partnership contract or other arrangement between persons of the same sex purporting 
to bestow the privileges or obligations of marriage is prohibited.  Any such civil union, 
partnership contract or other arrangement entered into by persons of the same sex in 
another state or jurisdiction shall be void in all respects in Virginia and any contractual 
rights created thereby shall be void and unenforceable.”  VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.3 
(West 2009). 
83. See Miller-Jenkins III, 637 S.E.2d at 337.
84. See Miller-Jenkins IV, 661 S.E.2d  at 827.
85. See GAY & LESBIAN ADVOCATES & DEFENDERS (GLAD), HOW TO GET
MARRIED IN MASSACHUSETTS 25 (2011), available at 
http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/publications/how-to-get-married-ma.pdf.  The 
publication states: 
In Massachusetts, a child born into a marriage is presumed to be the child of 
both parties, and both parents’ names are listed on the birth certificate. 
Nonetheless, this is just a presumption and does not have the same effect as a 
court judgment.  It is subject to being challenged and overturned. 
In addition, the marriage could encounter a lack of respect in some states, so 
relying on the fact of the marriage alone to protect your children is not the best 
approach.  Therefore, GLAD strongly recommends that you consult a lawyer 
and continue the practice of securing a second-parent adoption in order to 
obtain a decree of legal parenthood that should be recognized broadly outside 
of Massachusetts, independent of the marriage. 
16
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 12
2012] THE NEW “ILLEGITIMACY”: WINNING BACKWARD 737
is appropriate to question an effort that, even if successful, will produce so 
little of real value.  It is, in my opinion, a mistaken emphasis on marriage 
that propelled the current Iowa litigation.  When it comes to birth 
certificates, the Iowa attorney general is giving married lesbian couples 
something different from what married different-sex couples receive. 
When the lens through which all efforts are evaluated and judged is 
marriage equality, then choosing that battle makes sense.  For what it 
actually accomplishes for parents and children in Iowa, it makes much less 
sense.  There is always a cost to a marriage equality lens, as it leaves many 
relationships inappropriately unprotected.86  But when that lens produces a 
divide between “legitimate” and “illegitimate” children, it should be 
resisted. 
B. Maryland
Lambda has also viewed parentage through a marriage equality lens in 
Maryland.  Maryland’s Attorney General, Douglas Gansler, issued an 
opinion in February 2010 that same-sex marriages from elsewhere could be 
recognized in Maryland.87  In February 2011, Lambda claimed success 
when the state agreed to place the name of two mothers on a child’s birth 
certificate if the mothers were married. 88 
The press release announcing this success did not assert that this made 
the two women legal parents, because it could not; a birth certificate is 
evidence of parentage but not proof of parentage.  Lambda subsequently 
stated this explicitly and urged that married same-sex couples pursue 
second-parent adoptions.89  But second-parent adoptions are also available 
to parents who do not marry, and any campaign encouraging second-parent 
adoption should be targeted at all same-sex couples.  What Maryland 
desperately needed was legislation to protect all children of same-sex 
couples when there has not been a second-parent adoption. 
86. See generally NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE:
VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 7 (2008) (asserting that the marriage-equality 
movement supports gay civil rights, but it does not focus on family-based needs). 
87. Whether Out-of-State Same-Sex Marriage That is Valid in State of Celebration
May Be Recognized in Md., 95 Op. Md. Att’y Gen. 3, 3-4 (Feb. 23, 2010), available at 
http://www.oag.state.md.us/Opinions/2010/95oag3.pdf.  Maryland does not allow 
same-sex couples to marry.  A constitutional challenge to its prohibition failed.  See 
Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 634 (Md. 2007) (holding that the Maryland law is 
not unconstitutional under rational basis review). 
88. Maryland Will Issue Birth Certificates Naming Two Married Moms as Parents:
Lambda Legal Applauds New Protection for Children, LAMBDA LEGAL (Feb. 11, 
2011), http://www.lambdalegal.org/news/pr/md_20110211_birth-certificates.html. 
89. See LAMBDA LEGAL, BIRTH CERTIFICATES AND SECOND-PARENT ADOPTIONS
FOR MARRIED SAME-SEX COUPLES IN MARYLAND (2011), available at 
http://data.lambdalegal.org/publications/downloads/fs_birth-certificates-second-parent-
adoptions-maryland.pdf (stressing that a court-ordered adoption decree is the best 
means of ensuring both parents’ legal rights as a child’s parents are respected). 
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In 2008, the Maryland Court of Appeals ruled in Janice M. v. Margaret 
K. that the state does not recognize de facto parents, thereby overruling
lower appellate court rulings that for many years had guaranteed that a
child would not lose either parent if his or her parents split up.90  In
response, in 2010, the legislature was poised to enact a law that would have
negated Janice M. and created de facto parentage by statute.91  The
Attorney General then issued his opinion recognizing same-sex marriages
from elsewhere.92  Anti-gay legislators threatened to amend the de facto
parentage legislation to add language denying recognition to out-of-state
same-sex marriages, and one of the measure’s chief sponsors, State Senator
Jamin Raskin, halted the parentage bill to prevent that.93
In 2011, Senator Raskin did not reintroduce a de facto parent bill, 
because the state’s gay rights lobbying organization, Equality Maryland, 
wanted all the legislative focus on obtaining marriage equality.  Lambda 
Legal also participated in Maryland marriage equality efforts.  Those 
efforts failed but are being renewed in 2012.  Meanwhile, there is no 
progress at all for de facto parents who do not marry. 
CONCLUSION 
The national gay rights legal organizations have consistently urged 
recognition of the parent-child relationships formed in gay and lesbian 
families, without regard to which parent has a genetic connection to the 
child.  Boston-based Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders (GLAD), 
for example, filed an amicus brief in support of the non-biological mother 
in A.H. v. M.P.94  Although GLAD is largely responsible for the advent of 
civil unions and marriage equality in New England,95 its lawyers do not 
90. 948 A.2d 73, 87 (Md. 2008) (holding that Maryland does not recognize de facto
parent status because it would be contrary to Maryland jurisprudence requiring a 
showing of unfitness of the biological parent or the existence of exceptional 
circumstances in custody and visitation disputes). 
91. See S.B. 600, 427th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2010).
92. Op. Md. Att’y Gen., supra note 87, at 54 (maintaining that the Maryland Court
of Appeals is likely to find that marriages of same-sex couples that are valid under a 
different jurisdiction may be recognized under state law). 
93. Conversation with Sen. Jamin Raskin, Professor of Law, Director of Law &
Government Program, American University Washington College of Law, in 
Washington, D.C. (Mar. 19, 2010). 
94. See, e.g., GAY & LESBIAN ADVOCATES & DEFENDERS (GLAD), WINTER BRIEFS 
6 (2007), available at http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/
newsletters/Briefs2007_Winter.pdf. (defending the parental rights of non-biological
parents).
95. See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 866-67 (Vt. 1999) (holding that Vermont
may not exclude same-sex couples from the benefits and protections the state provides 
to different-sex married couples); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 
424 (Conn. 2008) (holding that extending civil unions but not marriage to same-sex 
couples violates the state’s guarantee of equal protection); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. 
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believe that a child’s relationship with a parent should be severed, or a 
child denied financial support, simply because her parents did not marry 
each other.  Lambda Legal’s representation of Debra H. was consistent 
with its work on behalf of nonbiological parents across the country.96 
Yet the high visibility of marriage equality efforts has melded the 
relationship between parentage and marriage in a manner that confuses 
policymakers, advocates, and couples planning children.  A recent 
newspaper article about a lesbian wedding described one such couple in 
Washington, DC.97  After one of the women became pregnant through 
donor insemination, the couple decided to marry based in part on the legal 
consequences, described in the article as including “the right to have [the 
nonbiological mother] listed as a parent on the baby’s birth certificate.”98  
District of Columbia law authorizes the placement of the second mother’s 
name on the birth certificate of a child conceived through donor 
insemination regardless of whether the couple is married; the couple can 
sign a Consent to Parent form available through the DC Office of Vital 
Records.99  When I contacted the journalist who wrote the article to correct 
the mistaken impression, she responded that she suspected the couple 
themselves did not realize they had an option other than marriage to 
achieve this result.100 
Every time a gay rights organization links parentage to marriage, as 
Lambda has done in Maryland and Iowa, it furthers such mistaken 
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 957 (Mass. 2003) (holding, for the first time in a state’s 
highest court, that exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage violates the state’s 
constitution). 
96. Lambda Legal represents Janet Miller-Jenkins in the Virginia litigation
concerning her parental status. The group has also represented non-biological parents in 
other states.  See Egan v. Fridlund-Horne, LAMBDA LEGAL (Apr. 29, 2009), 
http://www.lambdalegal.org/in-court/cases/egan-v-fridlund-horne.html (Arizona); In re 
S.J.L., LAMBDA LEGAL (Oct. 4, 2010), http://www.lambdalegal.org/in-court/cases/in-
re-sjl-and-jkl.html (Ohio); In re L.K.M., LAMBDA LEGAL (Feb. 2, 2011), 
http://www.lambdalegal.org/in-court/cases/in-the-matter-of-lkm.html (Ohio); Jones v. 
Boring, LAMBDA LEGAL (Feb. 23, 2004), http://www.lambdalegal.org/in-
court/cases/jones-v-boring.html (Pennsylvania); T.B. v. L.R.M., LAMBDA LEGAL (Oct. 
3, 1996), http://www.lambdalegal.org/in-court/cases/tb-v-lrm.html (Pennsylvania); 
N.B. v. A.K., LAMBDA LEGAL (May 4, 2011), http://www.lambdalegal.org/in-
court/cases/nb-v-ak.html (Alabama). 
97. Ellen McCarthy & Erin Williams, We Just Match Each Other at This
Emotional Level, WASH. POST, July 8, 2011, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/weddings/we-just-match-each-other-at-this-
emotional-level/2011/07/01/gIQAmnfK4H_story.html (discussing the recent marriage 
between Sarah Schooler and Mary Busker). 
98. Id.
99. When an unmarried heterosexual woman wants to list a father on her child’s
birth certificate the couple also must sign a form—a Voluntary Acknowledgement of 
Paternity, commonly referred to as a VAP—provided by the Office of Vital Records. 
100. E-mail from Ellen McCarthy, Writer, WASH. POST, to author (July 13. 2011)
(on file with author).   
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impressions.  The prominent argument that same-sex couples must be 
permitted to marry to further the best interests of their children also 
intensifies the impression that parentage within marriage provides benefits 
that cannot be obtained in any other way. 
Furthermore, every success limited to married couples will compound 
the distinction between those children whose parents marry and those who 
do not.  This is because if parentage based on marriage is achieved in Iowa 
or Maryland, for example, then Lambda and the other gay rights legal 
groups will vigorously defend that parentage when it is (inevitably) 
challenged in another state or at the federal level. 
National gay rights legal groups have limited resources and must 
prioritize their work, including their administrative advocacy, technical 
assistance, and public education efforts.  Cases or campaigns that will 
result in parentage recognition only for married couples are a mistake 
because they prioritize marriage equality goals at the expense of the 
children of unmarried same-sex couples.  The child of two heterosexuals 
who are not married has two parents.  The child of two lesbians deserves 
the same. 
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